One of the key roles of government is to coordinate the activities of citizens. One reason why governments are e¢ cient facilitators of coordinated action, in addition to their ability to force compliance or tax, is that they are typically endowed with more information than the individuals they govern. This advantage creates a dilemma for them, however, since it forces them to decide on how they should distribute the information in their possession to the population. This paper investigates this question. We investigate the "Announcement Game" de…ned by the government and those it governs and focus not only on how the government partitions the state space in an attempt to mask the true state of the world, but also on how, once this partition is determined, it communicates the partition it is using to the players in the Announcement Game. i.e., what type of language it uses. We present evidence that the language used to execute a communication strategy does a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium convergence process and also demonstrate that subjects playing the role of the government exhibit a great deal of sophistication in the communication strategies they employ and the language they use to execute them.
Introduction
One of the key roles of government is to coordinate the activities of citizens. For example, governments tax and redistribute in an e¤ort to reallocate resources to ends that it deems desirable. They design mechanisms to help citizens coordinate their contributions to pubic goods in a truthful manner. On a macro level governments jawbone in an e¤ort to get …rms to take collective actions that none of them is likely to take on their own and set monetary policy in an e¤ort to encourage or discourage joint investment behavior as state of the economy changes.
One reason why governments are e¢ cient facilitators of coordinated action, in addition to their ability to force compliance or tax, is that they are typically endowed with more information than the individuals they govern. Governments collect information about the state of the economy (unemployment rates, capital investment, housing starts, job vacancies etc.) and, as a result, possess an informational advantage. This advantage creates a dilemma for them, however, since it forces them to decide on how they should distribute the information in their possession to the population. This paper investigates this question. More precisely, let us assume that the government observes the true value of the state of the economy or some other relevant economic variable, x. Further, assume that it is a benevolent utilitarian social planner whose aim is to maximize the sum of the utility payo¤s of the agents it oversees. If it engaged in a strategy of truthfully announcing the information it receives, then, given that information, the agents would engage in a game whose payo¤s are state dependent and, assuming rationality, play to a Nash equilibrium of the game de…ned by the announcement. The problem, as we know from Crawford-Sobel (1982) , who study Sender-Receiver games with one Receiver, is that the resulting equilibrium may not be the outcome that maximizes the planer's preferences and hence he would have an incentive to garble his message so as to mislead the agents who rely on him. This may involve the government being vague about the exact value of the state of nature by partitioning the state space and o¤ering messages that do not precisely pin down what x is. 1 Such a communication strategy is composed of two parts. One is a strategic component we described above in which the leader attempts to partition the state space and communicate the optimal partition to his agents. Once this strategy is chosen the leader has to decide on how to execute his strategy, i.e., choose how to communicate this partition. This second component is typically ignored since, in equilibrium, once the strategic component is …gured out, it does not matter how the equilibrium partition is communicated to agents, i.e., it does not matter whether the leader says "the state is 5", "the state is between 4 and 6", "the state is a star", or "the state is low", since, in equilibrium, all agents are able to invert the language used and understand what the messages mean.
In this paper we focus on these two aspects of the communication game played by the government and its economic actors. First we investigate whether live human subjects, who play the role of the leaders in our communication game are capable of solving for the optimal information partition and can do so given the restrictions we place on them about the form of the language they can use. Note that these subjects are not required to use truthful strategies so they are free to dissemble as much as they would like. Second, we ask whether agents who receive information from e¢ cient social planners, i.e., those using an optimal truthful and veri…able announcement strategy, are capable of achieving e¢ cient outcomes given that optimal strategy. For this part of our experiment we replace the subjects acting as social planners with computers who employ a truthful and veri…able communication strategy but are capable of using di¤erent languages in its execution. In some cases the planer is constrained to report the true value of the state as he observes it. In others he must truthfully reports the interval into to which the state falls, while in others he uses natural language in reporting the state. We use computers here since we are interested in how the way an optimal communication strategy is executed (how it is communicated) matters in terms of welfare? The focus is on those who receive announcements.
The question of the welfare e¢ ciency of di¤erent execution strategies, we feel, is important for number of inter-related reasons. First, as a society we tend to communicate using natural language. 2 While this may be no impediment to e¢ cient coordination in equilibrium, where the meaning of words is known, it may signi…cantly slow the rate of convergence to the equilibrium since when natural language is used the meaning of words must be common knowledge amongst the agents if e¢ ciency is to be attained. Hence, to the extent that we spend a considerable amount of time out of equilibrium or converging to it, the way we communicate matters.
To be more precise, consider a game in which one player (the Leader) privately observes a state of nature, x 2 X, which is randomly realized from a commonly known distribution F [x] and must make a public announcement m about x to two other Players (the Followers). The Followers, upon hearing m, play a …nite strategy simultaneous move game, the payo¤s of which depend on the state of nature x and actions chosen by both Followers. The Leader represents the benevolent planner and his interests are to maximize the sum of the Followers' payo¤s (total surplus). We call such games "Announcement Games"and focus on a sub-class of such games, in which preferences of the Leader and the Followers are aligned for some values of x but diverge for others.
In the …rst set of experiments we employ real human Leaders in an e¤ort to see if live subject are 2 One of the examples of vague communication are the announcements made by the Federal Reserve Bank regarding the state of the economy. In monetary policy of the United States, the term Fedspeak (also known as Greenspeak) is what Alan Blinder called "a turgid dialect of English" used by Federal Reserve Board chairmen in making intentionally wordy, vague, and ambiguous statements. This strategy was used most prominently by Alan Greenspan, the previous chairman.
capable of …guring out the optimal communication strategy. These experiments are similar to the standard cheap-talk game in which the real Leader, upon observing the state of the nature, x 2 X, can report any value to the two other Followers, x 0 2 X. We call this communication strategy Strategic Values. Even though the Leader is not constrained to report the truth, the repeated interaction with the Followers may serve as a disciplining device and prevent the real Leaders from lying too often.
In the second set of experiments, we concentrate on the behavior of the Followers when intervals or word strategies are used to communicate. Thus, in these experiments, we deliberately abstract from the behavior of the Leader and use the computerized Leader whose strategy is programmed. Subjects participating in these experiments perform the roles of the Followers only and they are informed which type of strategy the computer is using to announce value of x. When the intervals or the words are used, the programmed partition is the one that maximizes the sum of the Followers' payo¤s for all x 2 X and participants are aware of that. When words are used, subjects are informed of the number of words used but not the cuto¤ that separates them; this is what they have to …gure out by playing the game repeatedly. (Before subjects engaged in these treatments they engaged in an experiment where the computerized Leader was constrained to report truthful values. This was done to give our subject experience with the game being played. We call this communication strategy Truthful Values and, while not an optimal communication strategy we use it to compare the performance of the Followers in these games to those where the Leader uses interval and words. 3 We study two parameterizations of the announcement game with the only di¤erence between them being the relative size of the disagreement region (i.e., how closely aligned the preference of the Leader and Followers are). This exercise is done to understand whether the performance of various communication strategies depends on the properties of the announcement game being played.
Our experimental results are summarized below. 3 The thought experiment that motivates our second set of experiments is as follows. Say that two benevolent Leaders, both using the same communication strategy in which they partition the state space into intervals and communicate those intervals to the players, are forced to execute them in two di¤erent ways. One Leader is constrained to simply report the sub interval into which the state x falls while the other is constrained to describe each sub interval using words. The di¤erence between the intervals and words is equivalent to the di¤erence between being ambiguous and being vague. More precisely, intervals are ambiguous since, while they tells the Followers the interval into which x falls, they do not tell the exact value of x; if x 2 [0; 3] then x can be any number between 0 and 3. Words, on the other hand, create vagueness in communication since, unless one knows where the interval associated with the word "low" stops and "medium" starts, such statements lack meaning. While ambiguous statements have multiple meanings, vague statements may be de…cient in meaning unless one knows exactly where the boundaries between words lie (see Fine (1975) and Sainsbury (1990) ). Since the theoretical literature in this area is only interested in studying the properties of optimal communication strategies the distinction between vagueness and ambiguity is irrelevant because, in equilibrium, the same behavior will be observed once the communication strategy is known whether one uses words, intervals, hand signs or smoke signals. However, if we have learned anything from experimental economics it is that people rarely jump to equilibrium deductively but rather learn their way to it over time. It is in this convergence process that we expect the type of language used to communicate may make a di¤erence and in which the use of natural language, words, might be disadvantaged.
1. In our Strategic Values Treatment where subject leaders are free to communicate using values but are not constrained to be truthful, subjects exhibit a great deal of strategic sophistication. More than 80% of the subjects use the optimal communication strategy and about 10% truthfully reveal the state of nature x to their followers. Under these circumstances, subjects that perform the role of the followers tend to treat the announcements as if they were truthful. When the disagreement region is relatively large the leaders that use the optimal strategies achieve similar levels of e¢ ciency as the leaders that use the truth-telling strategy. When the disagreement region is relatively small the optimal strategies strictly outperform truth-telling strategy.
2. Optimal strategies employed by the human leaders perform (weakly) better than any of the communication strategies executed by the computerized leaders.
3. When we compare the performance of di¤erent communication strategies in the computerized leader treatments, we …nd that:
(a) In general, words function on par with the intervals but only when the leader uses the minimally necessary number of words.
(b) A too-large vocabulary (in our experiments four words rather than two), even when optimal, tends to confuse subjects. Reaching a common interpretation of words is an important determinant of performance: those subjects that converged on a common meaning of words achieve higher e¢ ciency levels than those that do not.
(c) Even though theoretically we expect intervals to outperform the truthful values strategy in both games, behaviorally it is true only when disagreement region is relatively small. When the disagreement region is large using intervals fails to be advantageous.
We will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we describe the Announcement Game which will serve as the underlying structure for our experiments. Section 3 describes our experimental design and Section 4 presents the results. We discuss related literature in Section 5. Section 6 o¤ers some conclusions. The instructions for the experiment are presented in the Appendix.
The announcement games: parametrization
Consider Game 1, in which there are three players: the Leader and two Followers. The Leader privately observes the state of nature x randomly drawn from the know distribution F [x] = U [0:2; 6:2] and makes a public announcement M describing the value of x to the two other Followers. The Followers upon hearing the announcement, play a simultaneous-move game the payo¤s of which are described in Table 1 . The Leader receives the sum of the Follower'payo¤s. 4 option B x + 6; 1:5x 1:75x + 8:75; 6 0:5x
As we see in Table 1 , the payo¤s of both Followers, as well as the Leader, depend on the value of x and actions taken by the Followers. Two features of this game are worth noting. First, consider the simpli…ed version of the announcement game described above in which the Followers observe the value of x and then simultaneously choose option A or B faced with the payo¤ matrix depicted in Table 1 . This simpli…ed game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for every x 2 [0:2; 3) [ (3; 6:2], which is (A,A) if x > 3 and (B,B) if x < 3. When x = 3, there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (A,A) and (B,A). We will use the term "Followers preferences" to informally refer to the Nash equilibrium of this simpli…ed version of the announcement game, in which the Followers observe the realization of x before making their choice. Second, the outcome of the matrix game depicted in Table 1 that maximizes the total surplus (which is the payo¤ of the Leader) does not always coincide with the Nash equilibrium of the matrix game, in which the Followers know realization of x before choosing their actions. In fact, the total surplus is highest when the (A,A) outcome occurs when x 5 and the (B,B) outcome occurs when x < 5: Figure 1 below presents graphically these two features of the simpli…ed version of the announcement game, in which the Followers observe the realization of x before making their choice. As you can see in Figure 1 , while the preferences of the Followers and the Leader coincide for low (below 3) and high (above 5) values of x, they di¤er in the region where x is between 3 and 5. We call this region the "disagreement region". In order to achieve the Leader's most preferred outcome for all values of x, the Leader will have to, in some way, disguise the value of x when it fall in the disagreement region.
Because we are interested in investigating whether the performance of various communication strategies depends on the properties of the underlying announcement game being played, we introduce in our experiment a second announcement game (Game 2), which is similar to the Game 1 with the only di¤erence that the relative size of the disagreement region in the simpli…ed version of Game 2 (in which the Followers observe the realization of x before making their choice) is smaller than the one in the Game 1. Table 2 describes the payo¤s of the Followers in Game 2, where state of the world is drawn from F [x] = U [0; 9], while Figure 2 depicts the preferences of the Leader and the Nash equilibrium of the simpli…ed version of Game 2 for every possible value of x. Note that for Game 2 the disagreement region is much smaller than it is in Game 1 especially relative to the support of x. 
The announcement game with socially optimal communication strategies
The question raised above is whether it is possible for the Leader to obtain the socially optimal outcome for all value of x? The answer is yes. One way to do so in Game 1 is to partition the state space into two subintervals 5 Given the linearity of the Followers'payo¤s in x and assuming F [x] is uniform, Bayesian updating leads to the following estimates of x conditional on m i : Exjm 1 = 2:6 and Exjm 2 = 5:6. Therefore, upon hearing the announcement m 1 , the Followers believe that the expected value of x is below 3 and it is in their best interests to play equilibrium (B,B). Similarly, after the announcement m 2 , the Followers believe that x is above 5 and, thus, play equilibrium (A,A). In other words, by using the coarse partition of the state space, the Leader is able to trick the Followers into playing the socially optimal outcome for all x 2 X. While using two subintervals is the minimal partition necessary to achieve an optimal outcome, it is not the only one. For example, the following partition also achieves the socially optimal outcome: 6 Note that in this partition the additional subintervals are redundant because they split up the agreement regions in inconsequential ways.
These partitions solve the strategic problem faced by the Leader. The remaining question is does it matter how he executes this strategy. For example, he might use an "interval strategy" and simply report the subinterval into which x falls, or a "words strategy" and assign a word to the subinterval into which x falls (i.e., announce "x is low" or "x is high") 7 . As we noted above, in the equilibrium of this game, it makes no di¤erence how this strategy is executed since Followers should be able to invert any consistent set of messages and play accordingly. While this claim may be true for the equilibrium of the game, it is still an open question as to whether words or interval are equally e¤ective in the convergence process. For example, if intervals are used and all Followers know that the Leader has divided the interval into two subintervals and is announcing the true subinterval when he/she speaks, then when it is announced that x 2 [0:2; 5] it is immediately obvious what subinterval x lies in and each Follower can assume that the other Follower knows this as well. The only uncertainty remaining is the strategic uncertainty of thinking about how one's opponent will choose given that both subjects have heard the same announcement. When words are used, whether two or four, things are more complex. When the two words strategy described above is used, our subjects know that the Leader has partitioned the interval into two subintervals and has associated a word to each one, but they do not know what these intervals are. That they will have to learn. In addition, they do not know what interpretation their opponent is giving to each announced word. While the Follower 1 has a dominant strategy to choose action A when he believes that x > 3 and B otherwise, the Follower 2's best response depends on the action of Follower 1. So there is a "common interpretation" problem when words are used: the Followers may interpret the message "x is low" di¤erently, and, thus, update the value of x di¤erently and, essentially, play di¤erent subgames. This common interpretation problem is the reason that we expect our subjects to have a more di¢ cult time reaching equilibrium when words (especially four words) are used 8 . Obviously, once the Followers have converged on a common interpretation and have learned the Leader's vocabulary, all of these concerns vanish and words are equivalent to intervals. 6 The following four subinterval partition will achieve the e¢ cient outcome in Game 2 for all values of x 2 X: [0; 2], (2; 6], (6; 8] and (8; 9] . 7 In this paper the words used are assumed to have natural meanings so that when we say "x is low" it is assumed that people understand that x takes smaller value than when the announcement is "x is high". 8 If two words are used and the Players know that the goal of the Announcer is to maximize the sum of the payo¤s of the Players (which is the case in our experiment), then all Players should be able to …gure out how the Announcer will divide X. However, when the Announcer uses more than the minimal number of words, how he splits up X can be arbitrary and hence, it will be far harder for the subjects to infer his use of language.
Experimental Design
As we mentioned in the Introduction, we are interested in two related questions in our experiments. One is whether live subject leaders who communicate using values but without the constraint that they communicate truthfully are capable of converging on the optimal communication strategy. Second, we are interested in the behavior of the followers who receive truthful and optimal messages from computerized leaders. Here we are interested in seeing whether they are capable of coordinating their behavior on the announcements they hear and are able to interpret these messages e¢ ciently.
The experimental design was structured to capture the salient features of the announcement games described in section 2 and to answer our main questions of interest. We ran 4 di¤erent experiments in which a total of 201 subjects participated. The subjects were recruited from the general undergraduate population of New York University and subjects were inexperienced in this task. The experiments were run at the experimental laboratory of the Center for Experimental Social Science. In each experiment subjects were recruited and brought into the lab where they were randomly assigned to groups of three (in Experiments 1 and 2) and groups of two (in Experiments 3 and 4). In the Experiments 1 and 2, real subjects played the role of Leaders; in the Experiments 3 and 4 the role of the Leader was performed by the computer and this was announced to the participants. The payo¤s to the subjects varied depending on the experiment with average payo¤s ranging from $22 for Experiments 1 and 2 for an hour and …fteen minutes sessions to $35 for Experiments 3 and 4 which lasted about two hours. 9 The Experiments 1 and 2 used the parameters of the Game 1 and the Game 2, respectively, and were conducted in an identical manner. All subjects participating in these experiments were divided into the groups of three: one subject was assigned the role of the Leader and the other two were assigned the roles of the Players 1 and 2. The group and role assignments were …xed for the duration of the experiment, which consisted of 20 identical decision rounds. At the beginning of each round, the value of x was drawn by the computer and revealed to the Leader but not to the Players in a group. 10 The task of the Leader was to make an announcement regarding the value of x, which could be any number from the support of x. Both Players observed the (same) announcement made by the Leader and were prompted to choose a strategy A or B. At the end of the round, the Players observed the realization of x, the announcement made by the Leader about x, the action they and the other Player chose and their payo¤s. The Leader was not constrained to report truthfully, and, thus we will call this experiments the Strategic Values treatment.
The Experiments 3 and 4 consisted of four parts (treatments) each with 20 rounds. The instructions 9 We present the complete instructions for the Experiment 2 (Game 2) in Appendix A and for the Experiment 3 (Game 1) in Appendix B.
1 0 In each round the value of x was chosen in an iid fashion for each group of subjects using a uniform probability de…ned over the support [0:2; 6:2] in Game 1 and [0; 9] in Game 2.
of each part was read to the subjects only after they had …nished the previous part so subjects had no idea of what was going to transpire in subsequent parts of the experiment. Subjects were randomly matched into pairs for each part of the experiment. Once a part of the experiment (20 rounds) were over, subjects were randomly re-matched to form new pairs for the next 20 rounds of the experiment. The Experiment 3 used the parameters of the Game 1, while the Experiment 4 used the parameters of the Game 2 described in section 2.
In Part I of the Experiment 3 (Experiment 4) the subjects played the game depicted in Table 1 ( Table 2 ) for 20 rounds, each round with a new and commonly known value of x. More precisely, in each round they …rst were informed of the true value of x for that round. The payo¤ matrix with that value of x substituted in was then shown to them. They were next prompted to choose a strategy A or B. After the round was completed they were reminded of what they chose, informed of what their opponent chose and shown their payo¤s and those of their pair member. The next round then started with a new value of x being chosen and displayed to them along with the relevant payo¤ matrix. We call this part of the experiment the Truthful Values treatment.
In Part II of the Experiment 3 (Experiment 4) at the beginning of each round a value of x was randomly determined. Here however, instead of having the value of x announced, a computerized Leader used a word from a two-word vocabulary consisting of the words "low" and "high" to describe it. The computer used an announcement strategy that, in theory, should achieve socially optimal outcome as a Nash equilibrium (the sum of Follower payo¤s) by stating "x is low" whenever x was between 0:2 and 5 (0 and 6) and announcing "x is high" when x is between 5 and 6:2 (6 and 9). The subjects were not told the actual strategy but were told that the computer was using a …xed strategy with two words (i.e. a strategy that did not change as a result of what happened in the play of the game) whose aim was to maximize the sum of their payo¤s. After hearing the announcement the Followers were prompted to choose a strategy, A or B, and then were given the same feedback as the Followers in Part I, i.e. they were told the true value of x in that round, their strategy choice, that of the opponent, and both payo¤s. We call this part of the experiment the Two Words treatment. [6; 8] and [8; 9] ) the Leader used the words "lowest", "higher", "even higher", and "highest", respectively. We call this part of the experiment the Four Words treatment.
Part IV of the Experiment 3 (Experiment 4) had the subjects play the same announcement game but this time instead of the computerized Leader using a words strategy he announced which of two intervals the value of x lay in, i.e. he announced "x is between 0:2 and 5" or "x is between 5 and 6:2" ("x is between 0 and 6" or "x is between 6 and 9"). In other words the computer was programmed to use the intervals strategy. The intervals used were the same as those attached to the words "low" and "high" but now there was no need for the subjects to jointly interpret words because the underlying intervals were reported to them. We call this part the Intervals treatment.
There were two more tasks that the subjects performed during the Experiments 3 and 4. In Parts II and III they were asked in rounds 5, 10, 15 and 20 to predict the intervals associated with the words being used by the Leader and also to predict the intervals they thought their pair member was using to describe the Leader's strategy. In other words, for the two-word treatment in Part II they were asked to state the cuto¤ value that di¤erentiated the words "low" and "high" in the interval [6; 8] and [8; 9] ). Subjects were rewarded for this task using a quadratic scoring rule which penalized them for deviations from the true cuto¤s. This task was included since we were interested in seeing if the subjects converged on a common understanding of the words being used by the computerized Leader and whether such convergence can predict how well they perform. Obviously the language used by the Leader could only be e¢ cient if it was interpreted identically by the people listening to it and this elicitation was done to see how easy it was for pairs to come to a common understanding of the language of the Leader. 11 In both human and computerized Leaders experiments we used …xed matching. 12 The reason we used this design is that in human Leaders treatments, as well as in the words treatments, subjects have to establish the convention of what the announcements mean in order to have a shot at reaching coordination when hearing those announcements. The alternative way, in which subjects are rematched into new groups after every period, we feel, is extremely hard as it complicates signi…cantly learning the meaning of the announcements made. Moreover, in the human Leaders treatments, our data suggests that di¤erent Leaders use di¤erent announcement strategies, the performance of which would be hard to assess if we were to implement a random matching design. In addition, in the two-words treatment, some pairs of the Followers converged on the common interpretation of the meaning of the words used by the computerized Leader, while others did not. Fixed matching in this part of the experiment allows us to identify those pairs and compare their performance. We kept the …xed matching in the remaining parts of the experiments for consistency.
Our experimental design is summarized in Table 3 . 
Results

Structure
We present our experimental results in the following order. First, we consider Experiments 1 and 2 and ask whether human Leaders are capable of …guring out the optimal communication strategy in our setup. We classify the behavior of the Leaders according to the announcement strategies they use and compare their performance in terms of the e¢ ciency. We then look at the behavior of the Followers to document whether they followed the announcements of the Leaders. Second, we ask what can be done to improve the coordination of the Followers and overall welfare over the one observed in Experiments 1 and 2. For this purpose, we consider Experiments 3 and 4, in which the role of the Leaders is performed by the computers that are programmed to use speci…c optimal communication strategies and the Followers are aware of that. Among the strategies we investigate are the truthful communication strategy and several socially optimal strategies executed using either intervals or words. Put di¤erently, in this part we investigate whether a society in which a computerized Leader uses a socially optimal strategy can achieve higher levels of e¢ ciency than the ones achieved by the human Leaders.
Before we start presenting our results, let us discuss both the e¢ ciency measures we use and the regressions we run to evaluate the impact of treatments on e¢ ciency.
E¢ ciency Measures
To evaluate the performance of di¤erent communication strategies we consider two e¢ ciency measures. One, called "Fraction E¢ ciency" (FE), calculates the fraction of time the Followers choose the strategy pro…le that maximizes the total surplus (sum of their payo¤s), i.e., FE = Number of times pairs played outcome that maximizes their payo¤ sum Total number of choices made
The other, which we call the "Surplus E¢ ciency" (SE), measures the fraction of the potential surplus available that is captured, i.e., for a given value of x SE = Actual surplus captured -Smallest surplus available Highest surplus available -Smallest surplus available
Both measures are maximized when the pair of subjects play the socially optimal outcome in each period. While the two measures are positively correlated, they are not identical and capture slightly di¤erent aspects of subjects'behavior. For a given value of x, the FE indicates whether subjects played the socially optimal outcome or not and ignores what kind of mistakes were made if subjects played some other outcome. The surplus e¢ ciency, on the other hand, takes into account how subjects deviated from the e¢ cient outcome and how costly such deviations were. 13 
Statistical Analysis
To test the impact of our various treatments on fraction e¢ ciencies we use the logistic regression with random e¤ects. More precisely, we run the following logistic regression:
where y ij is a dichotomous variable taking on a value of 1 if a pair of subjects that were matched together (indexed by i) played the welfare maximizing outcome in period j and 0 otherwise and treatment is a dummy variable for the treatment. When we report p values in our discussion below, they represent the signi…cance of the coe¢ cient in the regression.
To compare surplus e¢ ciencies between treatments we use an identical random e¤ects GLS regression except for the fact that y ij variable is now continuous variable taking values between 0 and 1. In both cases the pair of subjects that were matched together for the whole duration of the treatment serves as the panel (group) id variable and we report the results at 5% level of signi…cance.
Human Leaders: Leaders'types
Recall that the subjects that performed the role of the Leaders in Experiments 1 and 2 were restricted to announcing a value for each observed value of x. Despite this restriction, there is quite a large amount of strategic freedom here. For example, the Leader can mimic the truthful-values strategy by simply reporting the value of x he or she sees each period. On the other hand, the Leader can mimic a word strategy by dividing the state space into sub intervals and announcing one value of x, say x 0 , when x lies in one subinterval and another, say x", when x lies in the other. A babbling strategy can be achieved by announcing same value of x no matter what is observed etc. We start by exploring how did the subjects that performed the role of the Leaders use this strategic freedom. We then investigate whether the Followers believed the announcements made by their Leaders and, …nally, we compare the e¢ ciency implications of using various communication strategies.
Given that Leader subjects have a fair degree of strategic freedom in Experiments 1 and 2, we start by classifying each of these subjects by the type of announcement behavior they exhibited. We will do this in two steps. First note that any strategy in which the Leader announces an x less than 3 (5) when x is below 5 (6) and an x above 5 (6) when x is above 5 (6) in the Game 1 (Game 2), respectively, is informationally equivalent to the interval strategy as we have de…ned it. We will call such a strategy "optimal" because it implements socially optimal outcome for every value of x. In addition, any strategy that reports the true value of x 0:5 will be called "truth telling" while any strategy that always reports the same value of x, say x 0:5, no matter what x is observed we will call a "babbling" strategy. Those subject strategies that fall into none of the categories we propose will be called "unclassi…ed".
In order to classify subject Leaders into these three categories, we will look at the behavior of each Leader over the 20 rounds of the experiment and, for each strategy, ask how many observations would have to be removed from the data set in order to …t the strategies described above exactly. A subject will be classi…ed as belonging to a type if that type best describes his or her behavior (minimizes the number of removed observations). The results of this calculation is presented in Table 4 . 
Square brackets list the average # of removed observations out of 20 to …t the strategy exactly
Round brackets in the last line list the percentage of the total population
As we can see in Table 4 , in the combined Game 1 -Game 2 sample, the vast majority of our subjects (82%) employed an optimal strategy, while only 10% used a truth telling strategy and 3% babbled. This behavior is remarkably sophisticated. The strategy we select as the best …tting strategy for the Leaders require removing rather small number of observations: on average about 3 (1) out of 20 observations for the optimal strategy and 4 (6) out of 20 observations for the truthful strategy depending on the Game played. Furthermore, as a general rule, the best …tting strategies for the Leaders also performed signi…cantly better than the second best …tting strategy according to our metric. For example, in order to make the second best strategy …t the data as well as our …rst best, one would have had to, on average, eliminate an additional 6:87 observations out of 20 observations in the Game 1 (Experiment 1) and an extra 8:38 observations out of 20 observations in the Game 2 (Experiment 2). This indicates that our type classi…cation is rather precise in that it clearly di¤erentiates between Leader types. Finally, there were two Leaders in the Experiment 1, for which the best-…tting strategy required removing 13 or 15 observations out of 20 available. We separate these two Leaders in the category of unclassi…ed strategies as we detect no pattern in the announcements made by these two subjects.
Since the overwhelming bulk of our Leaders are types that use an optimal strategy we will further classify these optimal types into the exact type of strategy they employed. Consider the following three strategies depicted in Figures 1a-1c for the Game 1. In Figure 1a we see a Leader who tells the truth about x in those regions where his preferences and those of the Followers coincide but, where they do not, he announces an x whose value is below 3. We call this strategy an A-type strategy, which is truth telling with an optimal lie in the disagreement region. In Figure 1b we see an Leader who perfectly replicates the partition used in the intervals and two words strategies by announcing the same value for all x less than 5 and a di¤erent value for all values above 5; we call this a B-type strategy. Finally, in Figure 1c we see a convex combination of these strategies since the Leader uses an interval strategy for values below 5 and tells the truth for all values above; we call this a C-type strategy.
To demonstrate what these strategies look like in our actual data set consider Figures 2a-2c which, in some sense, mimic these idealized types. For example, in Figure 2a we see a subject who is engaging in A-type behavior similar to that depicted in Figure 1a where he basically tells the truth except for values in the disagreement regions where he reports a value below 3. Figure 2b depicts the behavior of a subject who engages in B-type behavior in which he replicates an interval strategy in a very precise manner announcing 0:2 for all values below 5 and 6:2 for all values above 5. Finally, in a slightly messier manner the subject depicted in Figure 2c is behaving as a C-type. All of these strategies, in equilibrium, would implement socially optimal outcome. Our task is to try to further classify the subjects who employed an optimal strategy into these three categories. To do that we calculated the sum of the squared deviations of observed and predicted announcements for each of our strategies (A-type, B-type and C-type) and chose that strategy which minimized such deviations. The results of this classi…cation are presented in Table 5 . What's interesting is that of the 32 subjects who chose an optimal strategy 56% used an A-type strategy, 34:5% used a B-type strategy and 9:5% used a C-type strategy. In essence, there seemed to have been a preference for subjects to tell the truth whenever possible and do the minimal amount of lying necessary to get their preferred outcome. What these results indicate is that our subjects were very skillful in using numbers to construct a wide variety of sophisticated strategies many of which were optimal under the circumstances.
Conclusion 1
Most of the human Leaders (82%) use optimal communication strategies in the Experiments 1 and 2. More than 50% of Leaders that use the optimal communication strategies misrepresents value of the state x only for those x for which the preferences of the Leader diverge from the equilibrium of the matrix game and tell the truth in all other circumstances.
It is instructive at this point to relate our …rst result to the existing experimental literature that studies cheap talk model of Crawford-Sobel (1982) . The general message that emerges from this literature is that while main comparative statics of the Crawford and Sobel model holds true (see Dickhaut-McCabe-Mukherji (1995) who show that more information is transmitted when the degree of con ‡ict between the Sender and the Receiver is smaller), Senders tend to reveal too much information to the Receivers relative to the equilibrium prediction. In particular, Cai-Wang (2006) and Wang-Spezio-Camerer (2010) report excessive truth-telling by the senders and suggest level-k behavioral model as one possible explanation for this phenomenon. Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007) explain this over communication by estimating the type distribution of their subject pool and …nding that while one subset of subjects seem to have a preference for honesty other subjects only communicate honestly when it is in their interest to do so. 14 Contrary to these results, we rarely observe overcommunication on the part of the Leaders: only 4 out of 39 Leaders truthfully report value of x to their Followers. Further, the vast majority of the Leaders (more than 80%) used communication strategies that transmitted the "right" (equilibrium) amount of information.
Human Leaders: Followers'Behavior
Given the behavior of our subjects Leaders the next obvious question is whether Followers believed the announcements made by the Leaders and how did they behave based on these announcements. Table 6 reports how often Followers believed the Leaders and acted as the Leader desired given the announcement. This means that in the Game 1 (Game 2) when x was announced below 3 (below 5) they chose strategy B and when x was announced above 5 (above 6) they chose strategy A. As Table 6 shows, Followers followed the announcements of the Leaders 80% or more in both Experiments 1 and 2.
Notice that when the Leader reports x is below 3 (below 5), the Followers cannot distinguish between the case where x is indeed below 3 (below 5) or the case where it is between 3 and 5 (between 5 and 6) (where the Leader is trying to misrepresent x in order to trick them into playing the BB equilibrium). Therefore, theoretically, the precise value of x reported by the Leader when x is below 5 in Experiment 1 and below 6 in Experiment 2 does not matter as long as the Followers interpret this message correctly. However, the Followers in our experiments, in a majority of cases, behaved as if the announcement made by the Leader was truthful. Indeed, in rare occasions in which the Leader announced x as taking a value in the disagreement region (between 3 and 5 in Experiment 1 and between 5 and 6 in Experiment 2) Followers took action A most of the times: 85% in Experiment 1 (73 out of 86 cases) and 70% in Experiment 2 (14 out of 20 cases). This explains why most of the Leaders that employed the optimal communication strategy chose to shed the announced value of x down when trying to disguise the disagreement region.
Conclusion 2 Followers trust the Leaders and follow their announcements by taking welfare max-
one Sender and multiple Receivers whose payo¤s are independent from each other's actions. The authors …nd that there is a sizable fraction of senders who are excessively honest.
imizing actions given the reported value of x at least in 80% of all the cases.
Our observation that the Followers often "believe" the Leader and behave accordingly is related to the sucker behavior observed by Blume et al (2001) and Dickson (2010) . Blume et al. study the evolution of messages in the discrete version of the communication game, in which the Sender and the Receiver have partially aligned interests. In their study one out of three types of the Senders prefers to pool with the lower type to in ‡uence the action of the Receiver. Although this type often sends the message that fully identi…es him or herself, the Receivers chose, with positive probability, an action that is best for the Sender and not for them. This behavior does not disappear with experience. The di¤erence between the Blume et al (2001) framework and our strategic values treatment is that in our game the Followers cannot distinguish when the Leader is lying before taking an action. In a di¤erent setting, Dickson (2010) …nds that followers trust leaders too much, which indicates that followers do not fully account for the leader's strategic incentives to misrepresent the state of the world. 15 
Human Leaders: Overall Performance
Finally, in this section we compare the overall e¢ ciency levels achieved by various communication strategies used by human Leaders in our experiments. Table 7 presents two measures of e¢ ciency: fraction e¢ ciency (FE) which indicates how often the welfare maximizing outcome was played and surplus e¢ ciency (SE) which measures how much subjects lose by taking action di¤erent from the socially preferred one. Consider …rst Game 1, in which the disagreement region is relatively big. In this game, optimal strategies perform signi…cantly better than the unclassi…ed ones: optimal outcome occurs 61:5% of the time when the Leader uses one of the optimal strategies compared to 22:5% of the time when one of the unclassi…ed strategies is used. 16 At the same time, the Leaders that use optimal strategies achieve similar levels of e¢ ciency to those that use truth-telling strategy: FE index is between 55% and 65%, while SE index is between 70% and 75% depending on the type of communication strategy used by the Leader. 17 Further, there is no signi…cant di¤erence between type A and type B optimal strategies in terms of both fraction and surplus e¢ ciency. 18 The picture is di¤erent in Game 2, in which the disagreement region is relatively small. In this game, optimal strategies perform signi…cantly better than the truth-telling or the babbling strategies using any of the two measures of e¢ ciency. While truth-telling and babbling strategies select socially optimal outcome no more than 45% of the time, the optimal strategies do so more than 80% of the time. These fractions are statistically signi…cant at 1% level. Moreover, amongst optimal strategies, type C strategy achieves signi…cantly higher levels of e¢ ciency than type A strategy 19 and performs on par with type B strategy 20 , while types A and B strategies are statistically indistinguishable. 21 Conclusion 3 When the disagreement region is relatively large (Game 1) Leaders that use the optimal strategies achieve similar levels of e¢ ciency as Leaders that use the truth-telling strategy and achieve strictly higher levels of e¢ ciency than Leaders that use the unclassi…ed strategies. When the disagreement is relatively small (Game 2) the optimal strategies outperform both truth-telling and babbling strategies.
Computerized Leaders versus Human Leaders: Overall Performance
The results in the previous section suggest that human Leaders that use optimal communication strategies can achieve high levels of e¢ ciency in both games. The question we ask now is whether one can improve upon these levels of e¢ ciency by substituting the computerized Leaders instead of the human ones. The answer will obviously depend on the type of the communication strategy used by the arti…cial Leaders. We consider the following alternatives:
Truthful Strategy -in each round computer simply reports the actual realization of state of nature x and both Followers observe this information prior to making their decisions. 1 6 The di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at 5% level (p = 0:002). We reach the same conclusion if we compare our SE indeces (p < 0:001). 1 7 Statistical tests cannot reject the hypothesis that both FE and SE indeces are statistically indistinguishable (p > 0:10). Two Words Strategy -the state space is partitioned in the same way as when the Intervals Strategy is used, however, the computerized Leaders use words "low" and "high" to describe the subinterval in which actual x falls.
Four Words Strategy -the state space is partitioned into four subintervals and the words "lowest", "higher", "even higher" and "highest" are used to report the realization of x.
Notice that even though truth-telling strategy is not optimal for the Leader, it is the easiest one amongst all the communication strategies we consider since it does not require any updating on the part of the Followers. The other three strategies (Intervals, Two Words and Four Words) are all theoretically equivalent as they achieve socially optimal outcome for all values of x, and, thus, one could expect them to perform equally well. However, these strategies require di¤erent levels of sophistication from the Followers. Indeed, the Intervals Strategy is the simplest amongst three optimal communication strategies, since for its successful performance the only thing Followers need to do is to be able to update on the expected value of x given that it falls into each of the two subintervals reported by the computer and to play to the equilibrium of the matrix game given the expected value of x. The Two Words Strategy is more demanding as in addition to the updating required by the Intervals Strategy it also requires that (1) each Follower learns the cuto¤ between "low" and "high" used by the computer and (2) Follower 2 learns what Follower 1 believes the cuto¤ is since Follower 2's best response depends on the action of Follower 1 (this is the common interpretation problem that we described in Section 2). Finally, the Four Words Strategy seems to be the most complicated among the optimal communication strategies, as it requires Followers to learn three cuto¤s and update accordingly. As Table 8 indicates, there is no communication strategy executed by the computerized Leader (among the ones we considered in Experiments 3 and 4) that would outperform optimal communication strategy employed by the human Leader. Indeed, in Game 1 human Leaders that use optimal communication strategies achieve FE of 62%, while the truthful strategy performed by the arti…cial Leader (which is the best amongst the strategies executed by the computer) obtains lower FE of 52%. These fractions are statistically di¤erent at 6% level (p = 0:06). 22 In Game 2, optimal communication strategies employed by the human Leaders obtain the same FE levels of 82% as the Intervals Strategy executed by the arti…cial Leaders (p > 0:10). 23 The performance of optimal communication strategies is connected to whether the Followers "trust" the announcements made by the Leaders. In Section 4.2 we have shown that the Followers believed the announcement made by the human Leaders a vast majority of the time and chose actions which are part of the equilibrium strategy for the announced value of x. Table 9 compares this measure for the human Leaders treatment and computerized Leaders treatment when computerized social planners use intervals and two-words communication strategies. In the Game 1 (Game 2), we say that the Followers trusted the Leader if they chose strategy B when they heard announcements "x is low" or "x is between 0:2 and 5" ("x is between 0 and 6") and they chose strategy A when they heard an announcement "x is high" or "x is between 5 and 6:2" ("x is between 6 and 9"), 2 2 The surplus e¢ ciency measures are not statistically di¤erent between optimal strategies of the human Leaders treatments and truthful strategy of the arti…cial Leaders treatments (p > 0:10). 2 3 The surplus e¢ ciency measures are not statistically di¤erent between optimal strategies executed by the human Leaders and intervals strategy executed by the arti…cial Leaders (p > 0:10).
respectively. 
Computerized Leaders Computerized Leaders
Intervals strategy Intervals strategy "x is between 0:2 and 5" 52% "x is between 0 and 6" 77% "x is between 5 and 6:2" 90% "x is between 6 and 9" 93% Two-Words strategy Two-Words strategy "x is low" 51% "x is low" 76% "x is high" 90% "x is high" 92%
As Table 9 shows, the Followers tend to follow the announcement made by the human Leaders more often than they follow the announcement made by the computerized social planner, especially for low values of x that include the disagreement region. For example in the Game 1 when human Leaders announced value of x below 3 (the announcement which was made when x took values below 5), the Followers played action B 80% of the time. However, when the computer announced that "x is between 0:2 and 5" or "x is low" -the event which is informationally equivalent to stating x below 3 every time x takes values below 5 -the Followers played action B only about 50% of the time.
Conclusion 4
Optimal strategies employed by the human Leaders perform (weakly) better than any of the communication strategies executed by the computerized Leaders.
Computerized Leaders: Intervals versus Truth-Telling
The second observation that emerges from Table 8 is that the e¢ ciency ranking of the truthful and intervals strategies depends on the relative size of the disagreement region as captured by Game 1 and Game 2. We will now investigate in more detail why this is the case. , because it was in their joint interest, from the times he was trying to trick them into doing it when they would otherwise choose (A,A), which is the Nash equilibrium in that region. More importantly, since that region where they were being tricked was relatively large, Followers often chose strategy A hoping that x would be realized in the disagreement region where that was a Nash choice. Over all intervals in the Game 1, the advantages of being precise appear to outweigh those of being ambiguous and using intervals 52:4% to 41:5% using our FE index. This di¤erence is signi…cant at the 5% (p = 0:001). 24 One conjecture that explains why ambiguity failed in our Game 1 is that if the disagreement region had been smaller, then a Leader using an optimal announcement strategy would have had an easier time in tricking the Followers, since, although the Followers would know that he was trying to trick them part of the time, it would not be that often and therefore not worth deviating from the prescribed equilibrium. 25 Figures 4a and 4b demonstrate that our conjecture is correct using Game 2: intervals strategy outperforms truthful values strategy when the disagreement region is relatively small. 26 2 4 This result is also seen in the surplus e¢ ciency (Figure 3b ) since over all intervals the surplus e¢ ciency involved in using truthful values was 75:4% whereas it was only 59:2% when intervals were used, which is signi…cantly less (p < 0:001). 2 5 Think of the case where the disagreement region was only (4:8; 5]. In this case most of the time when the lower interval was announced the Players would know that they were not being tricked. Of course, the e¢ ciency gain here would be small since the disagreement region is so tiny. 2 6 In the Game 2 the advantages of being ambiguous are apparent. For instance, just as was true in the Game 1, for realizations of x in the disagreement region [5; 6] , where ambiguity is desirable, the use of intervals far outperforms that of truthful values 80% to 3:6% and over all regions by 81:8% to 71:1%; using our FE index. This di¤erence is signi…cant (p < 0:001). The big di¤erence is that in the region from 0 to 5, where the preferences of the Leader and the Followers agree, the intervals perform on par with the truthful values while they were dramatically worse in the Game 1. Including the fact that in the upper region [6; 9] we see almost equivalent results from both truthful values and intervals, we see that the overall result is that intervals outperforms truthful values. With respect to the surplus measure, we observe the same qualitative result: intervals generate higher SE levels than truthful values (85:3% versus 81:7%), even though this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant (p = 0:114).
Figure 4: Truthful Values versus Intervals in Game 2
Our data from the computerized Leaders treatments show that ambiguity, at least in the form of intervals, may indeed be desirable but the conditions under which this is true are more behaviorally subtle than we had previously thought. These results echo the ones we observed in the human Leaders treatments (albeit the small number of groups, in which human Leaders used the truth-telling strategy). As we discussed in section 4.1.3, optimal communication strategies employed by the human Leaders fail to outperform the truth-telling strategy in Game 1, in which the disagreement region is relatively big and at the same time achieved strictly higher e¢ ciency levels in Game 2, in which the disagreement region is relatively small.
Conclusion 5
When the disagreement region in the announcement game is relatively small, employing the interval strategy yields higher fraction and surplus e¢ ciency levels than does the strategy of reporting the true value of x. On the other hand, when the disagreement region is relatively large, the interval strategies fail to be advantageous.
Computerized Leaders: Optimal Communication Strategies
In this section we ask which of the optimal communication strategies executed by the computerized Leaders performs best?
Despite the common interpretation problem described above, it appears as if the overall performance of the Followers was equally e¢ cient when either two words or intervals were used. For example, in the Game 1 the overall fraction e¢ ciencies were 42% and 42% when two words and the intervals were used, respectively. We …nd that these fractions are not signi…cantly di¤erent (p = 0:944). For the Game 2 these percentages were 77% and 82% respectively for the two-words and the intervals; this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant (p = 0:119). There is also no significant di¤erence in the surplus e¢ ciencies in both Games (p = 0:454 in Game 1 and p = 0:144 in Game 2). 27 Hence we see no di¤erence in the performance of subjects when two words (minimal vocabularies) and intervals are used, which suggests that in our simple laboratory game the use of natural language does not seem to be a bar to e¢ ciency.
The situation changes when we look at four words. 28 Here there is a de…nite decrease in e¢ ciency when the Leader shifts from using two to using four words. More precisely, in the Game 1 while the overall fraction e¢ ciency for two-words was 42% and it fell to 30% when four words were used. This di¤erence is signi…cant (p < 0:001). In the Game 2, the overall fraction e¢ ciency for two-words was 77% and it fell to 61% when four words were used, which is signi…cantly less (p < 0:001). The surplus e¢ ciency measure follows the same trend: the use of the four words leads to a decrease in 2 7 Further there appears to be no di¤erence between the performance of the Players over any sub-interval between 0:2 and 6:2 in the Game 1 or 0 and 9 in the Game 2 using both measures of e¢ ciency. Results of these tests are omitted for brevity and available upon request from the authors. 2 8 Blume et al. (1998) also …nd that the performance of players may di¤er depending on the number of signals (or words) available for the Sender to use, although in their case the e¤ect depends upon the relationship of the number of signals and the number of types existing for the Sender. In our game, in essence, the number of types is in…nite. the captured surplus in both Games (p = 0:006 in Game 1 and p < 0:001 in Game 2).
We …nish this section by noting that when human Leaders used optimal communication strategies they achieved fraction e¢ ciencies of 62% and 82% and surplus e¢ ciencies of 71% and 85% in Games 1 and 2 respectively, which are (weakly) higher than any of the optimal communication strategies used by the computerized Leaders. This suggests that there is an added value to human Leaders beyond the partition of the state space underlying the communication strategy they use, which is not captured by the game-theoretic analysis of the announcement game.
Conclusion 6
In the computerized Leaders treatments, words perform as well as intervals as long as the minimally optimal number of words is used. Excessive vocabularies (four words rather than two) cut down on the e¢ ciency of words.
Computerized Leaders: Common Interpretation of Words
While in equilibrium words and intervals should be equally e¢ cient, when words are used subjects are faced with the additional challenge of converging to a common understanding of what they mean. In particular, in Game 1 (Game 2) while the Follower 1 has a dominant strategy to choose action A when he believes that x > 3 (x > 5) and B otherwise, the Follower 2's best response depends on the action of Follower 1. Put di¤erently, Follower 2 faces a "common interpretation" problem when words are used. In the two-words treatment, what must become common knowledge is the cuto¤ that the computer uses to di¤erentiate between those x signals that will be called "low" and those that will be called "high". Such common agreement involves two things: agreement on the cuto¤ used by the Leader and also agreement on what Follower 2 thinks Follower 1 thinks the cuto¤ used by the Leader is. The …rst asks if the Followers can recognize the optimal language when they hear it while the second asks if Follower 2 knows that they are both speaking the same language (Follower 1 does not care what Follower 2 thinks since, given his dominant strategy, he only cares what the Leader means by "low" and "high"). In this section we are interested in comparing the performance of those Follower pairs that share a common interpretation of what words mean and those that fail to converge.
We focus on the two-words treatment and divide all pairs into two groups: those pairs that converged to the optimal two word vocabulary (i.e. the optimal cuto¤ value being used by the computer) by round 15 and those that did not. By convergence we mean that all three conditions below are satis…ed: Pairs that did not converge 83:3% 87:4%
As Table 10 shows, those pairs that converged performed far better than those that did not. For example, in the Game 1 those pairs that converged achieved an average fraction e¢ ciency of 54:3% as opposed to those who did not, where the fraction e¢ ciency was 26:7%. These percentages are signi…cantly di¤erent at the 5% level (p = 0:03). For the surplus e¢ ciency the numbers are 70:7% and 45:8%, respectively, which are signi…cantly di¤erent at the 5% level (p = 0:05). The results are even stronger in the Game 2 where converging pairs chose the surplus maximizing choice 100% of the time as opposed to only 83:3% of subjects who did not converge. The corresponding surplus e¢ ciencies for converging and non-converging pairs in the Game 2 are 100% and 87:4%, respectively. According to the Wilcoxon signrank test, fraction e¢ ciency achieved by subjects who did not converge in Game 2 is signi…cantly di¤erent from 100% (p = 0:0467); the same is true for the surplus e¢ ciency of 87:4% (p = 0:0467).
Conclusion 7
When two words were used by the computerized Leaders, those pairs of Followers who converged on a common and correct understanding of the vocabulary used performed better than those that did not.
Related literature
The Announcement Game introduced in this paper is closely related to a Sender-Receiver cheap talk game (see Crawford-Sobel (1982) ). 30 However, our announcement game di¤ers from this games in two ways. First, instead of there being only one Receiver, in the Announcement Game there is a set of two Followers who receive the announcement of the Sender (the Leader) and play an 2-person …nite strategy game whose payo¤s depend on x. In other words, (some) Followers care not only about their own interpretation of the announcement but also about how the other Follower interprets the announcement and behaves upon hearing it. Second, the relationship between the preferences of the Sender (the Leader) and the Followers is more complicated since for some values of x preferences coincide while for others they diverge. 31 Contrary to these papers we …nd that vast majority of the Leaders communicate the optimal amount of information to the Followers and only about 10% of the Leaders truthfully reveal the value of x to the Followers. At the same time, consistent with these papers, we …nd that most of the Followers tend to believe announcements made by their Leaders.
Experimentally our paper is closely related to the seminal work of Blume-DeJong-Kim-Sprinkle (1998, 2001) . In these papers the authors study …nite signal Sender-Receiver games which are either common or divergent interest games (see Blume et al. (1998) ) where the interests of the Sender and the Receiver are either aligned or opposite, or partial common interest games, (Blume et al. (2001) ), where the interests of the Sender and the Receiver are more complicated and are aligned for some types and opposed for others. They investigate whether the Sender and Receiver converge on a separating or pooling equilibrium and demonstrate that this depends on the relationship between the number of signals available to be sent by the Announcer and the number of actions available to the Receiver. In addition they investigate whether the fact that the announcements made have a predetermined meaning, like f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, or are meaningless, like f%;~; ; #g and have to have meaning attached to them, has a consequence for how quickly the players converge on a common understanding of the message space being used. They discover that while there is no meaningful di¤erence in the incidence of pooling or separating equilibria in these games, the players converge on their eventual equilibrium faster when there are preestablished meanings to the words used.
As Blume et al (2001) suggest in the introduction, one of the di¢ culties of the experimental tests of the Crawford-Sobel cheap talk model is implementing continuous types (state space), messages and action spaces. To avoid this problem Blume et al discretize the type space by representing classes of types by a single type whose incentives represent those of a typical member in that class. We take a di¤erent approach. Our paper does the …rst step towards resolving this di¢ culty by implementing continuous state space in all our experiments: in the Game 1 state of nature x is distributed uniformly between 0:2 and 6:2, while in the Game 2 x is distributed uniformly between 0 and 9. Moreover, in the Strategic Values treatment, human Leaders are free to announce any value of x from the set of all possible states X after observing the actual realization of x, which means that the message space is continuous as well.
There are other noticeable connections between our results and those reported in Blume et al (2001) . We discuss below three such results. First, in both Blume et al (2001) and our paper the pooling action was (almost) never observed: Blume et al report that pooling action was never taken in the last …ve periods of play, while we detect only one human Leader that used babbling strategy in the Strategic Values treatment. Second, in both papers the partition of the state space that most of the Senders (Leaders) used is consistent with partial common interest (PCI) condition. This is the condition that Blume et al introduce to analyze communication in the games with partial common interests. A partition of the state space satis…es PCI condition, if for any subinterval of the partition, the types that belong to the same subinterval prefer to be identi…ed as the members of this subinterval and there is no …ner partition that satis…es this property. PCI condition is much weaker than the equilibrium. Blume et al report that in the last …ve periods senders nearly always partition according to the PCI condition. Our results are similar: we observe more than 80% of the human Leaders using the communication strategies with the optimal partitions of the state space. Third, Blume et al document that frequency of observing the equilibrium play depends on the degree of the alignment of incentives between the Sender and the Receiver. In Game 2, in which there is only a slight departure from perfect incentive alignment, Blume et al report that 88% of the outcomes are consistent with a separating equilibrium. In Game 3, in which the misalignment is made more severe, this percentage is 50% for the separating equilibrium and 70% for the pooling equilibrium. At last, in Game 4, in which the misalignments of incentives even stronger than in Game 3, only 37% of the outcomes are consistent with a partial pooling equilibrium and none with a pooling equilibrium. Consistent with these results, we …nd that the size of the disagreement region between the Leader and the Followers is negatively correlated with the e¢ ciency achieved by the communication: in Game 2, in which the disagreement region is relatively small, human Leaders achieve fraction e¢ ciency of 73% and surplus e¢ ciency of 78%, while in the Game 1, in which the disagreement region is relatively large, these percentages drop to 58% and 69%, respectively.
While our paper owes a great deal to the Blume et. al (1998, 2001 ) papers, there are some important di¤erences. First, in our paper there is an additional layer of complexity resulting form the fact that our game is played with multiple Receivers (Followers), one of which cares not only about his/her own interpretation of the words being used by the Leader but also about the interpretation used by his/her opponent. This creates a common knowledge problem not present in Blume-DeJong-Kim-Sprinkle (1998, 2001) . Second, the purpose of our paper is di¤erent than those of Blume et al (1998 Blume et al ( , 2001 ) since we are neither interested here in how people attach meanings to symbols (although, as you saw, we do elicit the meaning subjects attach to the announcements made by our Leader) nor on whether they evolve a signalling or pooling equilibrium since in our game the pooling equilibrium is of little signi…cance. We concentrate more on the e¢ ciency achieved by di¤erent communication strategies. Despite these di¤erences, however, we share a focus on the properties of language as used strategically in games.
Finally, there are three recent experimental papers by Dickson (2010) , Serra-Garcia, van Damme and Potters (2012) and Agranov and Schotter (2012) that relate to our study. Dickson (2010) explores the e¤ects of a leader's communications on followers'beliefs about the state of the world, which is known only to the leader. In his framework, followers are uncertain about the state of the world and upon hearing the message from the leader play a coordination game, the payo¤s of which are state-dependent. Similar to our announcement game, the preferences of the leaders and those of the followers are only partially aligned: leaders sometimes have an incentive to misrepresent the state of the world in order to enhance coordination. Dickson …nds that leaders' communication strongly in ‡uence followers'beliefs about the state of the world even when the rational updating dictates that these messages are not credible. In other words, followers seem to trust leaders'messages too much and not fully account for leader's strategic incentives to misrepresent the state of the world.
Serra-Garcia-van Damme-Potters (2012) study the e¤ects of communication in a sequential public good game. In their game, the leader has private information about the return from contributing to the public account and he contributes …rst; the follower observes the leader's choice before making his own. When the leader has a communication channel he can report the return precisely (not necessarily truthfully) or be vague about it. Revealing truthfully the exact return may distort follower's incentives to invest. Thus, similar to our Announcement Game, in some states of the world the leader has an incentive to lie to the follower about the state of the world. Using vague messages allows the leader to avoid lying. The authors document that when leaders are forced to be precise they lie in an optimal manner. However, when vague messages are allowed, leaders fail to optimally use them: vague messages are used more often in the disagreement than in the agreement region. This can potentially give followers a way to distinguish when leaders are trying to trick them, but such behavior was not observed in the experiment, in which followers often ignore vague messages and simply mimic the behavior of the leaders.
Finally, Agranov and Schotter (2012) study an Announcement Game with multiple equilibria. They demonstrate experimentally that in a coordination game with multiple equilibria, payo¤ asymmetries and aligned Sender-Receiver incentives, it may still be advantageous to communicate in a coarse manner. This is true because such coarse communication may be able to mask existing payo¤ asymmetries and thereby facilitate coordination if people …nd it hard to coordinate in games with unequal equilibrium payo¤s.
With respect to other disciplines, there is considerable interest in vagueness and the vagueness properties of natural language among philosophers (see Sainsbury (1990) , Fine (1975) , and KeefeSmith (1996) among others) and psychologists (see Erev-Wallsten-Neal (1991), Wallstein-BudescuRapoport-Zwick-Forsythe (1986) and Clark (1990) ). Finally, Bart Lipman (2003) and (2006) theoretically investigates the vagueness properties of natural language. While Lipman focuses on the properties of vagueness in an equilibrium framework, we investigate how one achieves equilibrium outcomes using vague communication strategies.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate how a Leader (the Government) that has information in his possession that is payo¤ relevant for the individuals they govern (the Followers), should distribute this information. To shed light on this question, we experimentally study the performance of various communication strategies in the Announcement Games. These are the games in which one player, called the Leader, knows the value of the state of the world, x, and, upon seeing it, makes an announcement concerning its value to a set of Followers who then engage in a game of strategy whose payo¤s depend on the true value of x. The Leader is a benevolent planner whose interests are to maximize the sum of the Followers'payo¤s. We focus on announcement games, in which the preferences of the Leader and those of the Followers coincide for some values of x and diverge for the others and ask:
1. What form of communication between the Leader and the Followers is e¢ cient where the e¢ ciency is de…ned as maximizing the sum of the Followers'payo¤s?
2. How does the performance of di¤erent communication strategies depends on the properties of the underlying announcement game and, in particular, the size of the disagreement region?
3. How e¤ective are our subjects, when playing the role of the Leader (Government), in executing the optimal communication strategy?
In the experimental setting we consider several communication strategies, some performed by the subjects participating in the experiment and others performed by the computerized Leaders. We …nd that informed subjects (human Leaders) systematically and e¤ectively conceal information and, in fact, more than 80% of them use the optimal communication strategy. The Followers tend to believe the announcement made by their Leaders. Moreover, human Leaders that employ one of the optimal communication strategies perform (weakly) better than any of the communication strategies executed by the computerized Leaders. For both human and computerized Leaders, the relative performance of truthful values and intervals strategies depends on the size of the disagreement region in the announcement game being played. When preferences of the Leader and the Followers di¤er over a relatively large portion of the state space, interval strategies, which are theoretically optimal, fail to outperform the truthful values strategies; however, when the disagreement region is relatively small, interval strategies achieve signi…cantly higher e¢ ciency levels than the truthful values strategy. We also …nd that words perform as well as intervals as long as the computerized Leader uses the minimum number of them to communicate. Finally, when the number of words used by the computerized Leader is small, subjects seems capable of solving the common interpretation problem they entail and those pairs that converged on a common meaning of the words performed better than those who did not.
Appendix A -NOT FOR PUBLICATION Instructions for the Experiment 2
This is an experiment in decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make good decisions, you can earn a substantial amount of money, which will be paid to you at the end of the session.
The experiment consists of 20 identical decision rounds. At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly matched with two other subjects participating in the experiment. One subject in your group will be assigned to be player GREEN; the other subject will be player RED and the third subject -player BLUE. At the top of the screen you will be told whether you are acting as player GREEN, RED or BLUE. Subjects in your group and the roles assigned to them will not change for the whole experiment. The identity of the subjects in your group will never be revealed to you and subjects in your group will never know your identity.
The currency in this experiment is called tokens. All payo¤s are denominated in this currency. The total amount of tokens you earn in the experiment will be converted into US dollars and paid to you at the end of the experiment. For RED player the conversion rate is 7 tokens = $1, for BLUE player the conversion rate is 15 tokens = $1, for GREEN player the conversion rate is 22 tokens = $1.
Your decision in each round.
Each round of this experiment has the following ‡ow of events:
At the beginning of each round the computer will choose a number between 0 and 9 at random with equal probability. This means that the probability that 1:5 is chosen is equal to the probability that 6:25 is chosen, which is equal to the probability that 7:7 is chosen, etc... We will call the random number chosen x.
Number x chosen by the computer is observed only by the player GREEN. Players BLUE and RED don't get to see the value of x drawn.
After GREEN observes value of x, he makes an announcement about value of x, which is observed by both RED and BLUE players. The announcement can be any number between 0 and 9.
After the announcement is made, RED and BLUE each choose one of two available options labeled A or B. Each subject (RED or BLUE) in the group will make his/her choice without knowing what the other subject chooses.
The payo¤s of all players in the group depend on the actual value of x chosen by the computer, and the choices made by players RED and BLUE. We will describe those in details in the next section..
Payo¤s
The payo¤ of each subject in a particular round depends on the number x chosen by the computer, and the options chosen by the RED and BLUE players. Table below However, RED and BLUE will not know the exact value of x before you get to choose between option A and B. Instead, they will observe an announcement describing x, made by GREEN.
Player GREEN can make any announcement describing the value of x. Recall, that GREEN observes the actual value of x drawn randomly by the computer. Also, recall that payo¤ of GREEN equals to the sum of payo¤s of RED and BLUE, which depend on the actual value of x chosen by the computer and options chosen by RED and BLUE.
What your screen looks like:
On the top of the screen you will see whether you are acting as player BLUE, RED or GREEN.
All players in the group will also observe the payo¤ matrix described above.
Player GREEN will also observe the actual value of x that computer chose at random and payo¤ matrix with actual value of x substituted in. Before player GREEN will be prompt to make an announcement describing x, he will be able to use the built-in calculator. This calculator works as follows: for each value of x GREEN enters, it shows the payo¤ matrix with this x substituted in. This is the matrix that will be shown to BLUE and RED players if GREEN will choose to announce this value of x. GREEN can try as many values of x as he/she wants. When GREEN ready to make an announcement, he should simply press "con…rm announcement" button. Recall that announced x should be a number between 0 and 9.
Here is how the screen will look like for player GREEN:
After announcement is made, BLUE and RED both see the announcement and they also see the payo¤ matrix with announced x substituted in. RED and BLUE then choose between option A and B by clicking on the box A or B on the bottom of the screen and then "con…rm" button.
Here is how the screen for players BLUE and RED looks like:
[SCREEN SHOT FOR PLAYERS BLUE AND RED]
After both RED and BLUE have made their choices about option A or B, the following information will be observed by all players:
1. actual value of x chosen by computer 2. announced value of x made by GREEN 3. payo¤ matrix with ACTUAL value of x substituted in 4. cell with relevant payo¤s, determined by the choices made by RED and BLUE Then you will proceed to the next round which will identical to the round you just …nished except that at the beginning of the new round a new value of x will be chosen.
Payment
The number of tokens you earn in this experiment will be converted to the US dollars using the following conversion rates: If you are acting as player RED, the conversion rate is 7 tokens = $1.
If you are acting as player BLUE, the conversion rate is 15 tokens = $1. If you are acting as player GREEN, the conversion rate is 22 tokens = $1.
To summarize:
Each round starts with computer randomly choosing x between 0 and 9
Player GREEN observes the actual value of x chosen by computer
Player GREEN makes an announcement describing the value of x Both RED and BLUE see the announcement, as well as the payo¤ matrix with announced x substituted in; then they have to choose between option A and B.
After both RED and BLUE made their choice, everyone get to observe the actual value of x chosen by computer, announced value of x made by GREEN, payo¤ matrix with actual value of x substituted in and the relevant payo¤ cell determined by the choices made by RED and BLUE.
The …nal payo¤s of the subjects are determined by the payo¤ table described above. Payo¤s of RED are indicated by red color, payo¤s of BLUE are indicated by blue color in the payo¤ matrix. Payo¤s of GREEN equal to the sum of payo¤s of RED and BLUE.
Appendix B -NOT FOR PUBLICATION Instructions for the Experiment 3
This is an experiment in decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make good decisions, you can earn a substantial amount of money, which will be paid to you at the end of the session. The experiment in total consists of 4 parts: 20 identical decision rounds in each part. Before the start of each part you will be given the instructions for the following 20 decision rounds of the experiment.
The currency in this experiment is called tokens. All payo¤s are denominated in this currency. Your payment in the experiment will consist of several parts: you will earn tokens for each part of the experiment, the total amount of which will be converted into US dollars using the rate 29 tokens = $1. Payments for each part of the experiment are independent of each other and will be described to you in detail in the instructions. You will receive all the payments at the end of the experiment.
At the beginning of each part of the experiment you will be randomly matched with one other person participating in the experiment. One person in your pair will be assigned to be subject 1 and the other subject 2. You will stay paired with this subject for the 20 rounds of this part of the experiment. The identity of the subject you are paired with will never be revealed to you and the subject you are paired with will never know your identity.
At the top of the screen you will be told whether you are acting as subject 1 or subject 2. If you were assigned to be subject 1 at the beginning of one part of the experiment you will remain subject 1 for the whole part of 20 rounds. After the part is over you will be re-matched randomly with another subject participating in the experiment. Again, one of subject in the pair will be assigned to be subject 1 and the other subject 2, and so on.
Instructions for the …rst part of the experiment.
At the beginning of each round the computer will choose a number between 0:2 and 6:2 at random with equal probability. This means that the probability that 1:5 is chosen is equal to the probability that 4:25 is chosen, which is equal to the probability that 2:7 is chosen, etc... We will call the random number chosen x.
Your task in each round is to choose an option labeled A or B. The subject you are paired with also chooses between option A and option B. Each subject in the pair will make his/her choice without knowing what the other subject chooses.
Payo¤s.
The payo¤ of each subject in a particular round depends on the number x chosen by the computer, and the options chosen by you and your opponent. Note that your payo¤ depends on the x that was chosen by the computer. For example, say you were assigned to be Subject 1 and chose option A. Say, also, that the subject you are paired with choose option B and computer randomly chose x = 3. Then you will get the payo¤ in the upper right hand corner of the matrix, 2 3 + 8 = 14 tokens, while your pair member would get 3 tokens. If, on the other hand, you were to choose option B, while subject you are paired with chose option A and computer picked x = 1, then you will get 1 + 6 = 7 tokens and you pair member would get 1:5 1 = 1:5 tokens.
Before you and the person you are paired with will make the choice, you will both observe the number x that was picked by the computer. Also you will be shown the relevant payo¤ table with number x being substituted in the original payo¤ matrix described above. Then you will choose one of two options: A or B. You will …nalize your choice by clicking the "Submit" button.
Information Feedback
After both you and the subject you are paired with have made their choices you will get to observe the actions taken by you and your pair member, and both of your payo¤s. You will then proceed to the next round which will be identical to the round you just …nished except that at the beginning of the new round a new value of x will be chosen and the associated payo¤ table shown to you. The x chosen for any given round will be independent of that chosen in any previous round. In other words, it will again be a number drawn with equal likelihood from the interval 0:2 to 6:2.
Payment for the …rst part of the experiment
To determine your payment for the …rst part of the experiment we will sum up the number of tokens you earned in each of 20 rounds. This number of tokens will become part of total number of tokens you will earn in the experiment which will be converted into US dollars and paid to you at the end of the experiment.
each round starts with computer randomly choosing a number x between 0:2 and 6:2 and both you and the subject you are paired with will observe the value of x as well as the payo¤ matrix with number x being substituted in it; each subject in the pair, after observing the value of x and its associated payo¤ table, then chooses between option A or B;
the …nal payo¤s of subject are determined by the payo¤ table described above (you will see the payo¤ table on the screen all the time);
Instructions for the second part of the experiment.
At the beginning of this part of the experiment you will be randomly re-matched with one other participant in the experiment. One of subjects in the pair will be assigned to be subject 1, the other subject 2. You will stay paired with this subject for the 20 rounds of this part of the experiment. The identity of the subject you are paired with will never be revealed to you and the subject you are paired with will never know your identity.
Your decision in each round
In this part of the experiment everything stays the same as in part 1 except for one thing: the situation you are in is made more complex by the fact that you will not know the exact value of x before you get to choose between option A and B. Instead, you, and the subject you are paired with, will hear the announcement describing x.
This announcement will be made as follows: before the start of this part of the experiment, the computer will divide the interval, [0:2; 6:2] from which number x is picked into 2 pieces or subintervals. The computer will attach a word to each piece which will be announced to both subjects before you are asked to make your choice of option. For example, say that interval of possible values of x was divided in the following way: all numbers from 0:2 to 3:3 are in the group called "low", whereas all numbers from 3:3 to 6:2 are in group called "high". (In this example let us call 3:3 the "cuto¤ value" for x). Hence, given this partition, if at the beginning of the round, the computer randomly picks number x which is smaller than 3:3 (say 0:9 or 2:4), the computer will announce that x is "low". If, on the other hand, x is greater than 3:3 (say 5:7 or 3:9) the computer will announce that x is "high". Both you and your pair member will get to observe that announcement before making your choices, but you will not be told the cuto¤ value.
Note that with this example, if x was announced to be low, then x can be any number between 0:2 and 3:3 with equal chance. That is, x = 1:3 and x = 3 are equally likely when the announcement "x is low". The same is true for announcement "x is high": any number between 3:3 and 6:2 has the exact same chances of being the actual value of x.
The actual cuto¤ value used will not necessarily be 3:3; that value was just used for exposition. In the experiment the computer has been programmed to choose its cuto¤ value in a manner to maximize the sum of the payo¤s of the players.
Information Feedback
After the announcement is made and both subjects have made their choices about option A or B, the value of x picked by computer will be shown to you and your pair member as well as the options the two of you have chosen. This will allow you to determine your payo¤ which will also be shown to you on your screen. So, at the end of each round you will get to observe the value of x, the word used to describe it, the actions taken by you and your pair member, and both of your payo¤s. When a round is over you will then proceed to the next round which will identical to the round you just …nished except that at the beginning of the new round a new value of x will be chosen and a new announcement about its value will be made. The cuto¤ value used will be the same for all 20 rounds in this part.
Finally, after every 5 rounds we are going to ask you 2 questions:
what you think the cuto¤ value of the computer is, and what you think your pair member thinks the cuto¤ value used by the computer is.
This will be done as follows. On the separate screen that will appear after every 5 rounds you will be asked to choose where you think the cuto¤ point of the computer is. Say, you think that the computer announces "x is low" whenever x is smaller than 3, otherwise (x is bigger than 3) the computer announces "x is high". Then you should choose number 3 as a cuto¤ value of the computer. Simply enter this number on the screen that will appear, press "Enter" and click the "Ok" button. Then you will observe the picture of the interval from 0:2 to 6:2 divided into 2 sub-intervals according to the cuto¤ point you just chose: the red colored interval will indicate the region for which you think the computer announces "x is low" and the blue colored region will indicate the region for which you think the computer announces "x is high". If you want to change your decision, you can change the cuto¤ value by clicking "Enter"and then click "Ok"again. Once you are happy with the partition you've chosen please click the "Submit" button.
The second question (what you think your pair member thinks the cuto¤ value used by the computer is) is done exactly in the same way: you need to choose the cuto¤ value you think your pair member chose. Note that you will not get to observe the partition chosen by other subjects and no other subject participating in the experiment will observe your choice of partition.
Payment for the second part of the experiment
The number of tokens you can earn in the second part of the experiment will consists of two parts: …rst, we will sum up the number of tokens you earned in each of 20 rounds. In addition, you will earn tokens for answering the two questions described above every …ve rounds. This will be done in the following way: say, you are answering the …rst question stated above which is "what cuto¤ value you think the computer is using?" In other words, the question is asking you to state what you think the value of x is such that for any x below that value the computer will announce low and above which it will announce high. You will be prompted to answer this question. After you do we will compare your partition of the interval 0:2 to 6:2 to that actually used by the computer and pay you according to how close your partition, determined by you cuto¤ value, is to the partition used by the computer determined by its cuto¤ value. We will do this according to the following formula: Payo¤ = 12 0:33 (your cuto¤ computer's true cuto¤) 2 :
Note what this means. We will pay you a constant of 12 tokens but subtract from it the extent to which your cuto¤ value di¤ered from that of the computer (the distance between them) squared times 0:33. So, if you guessed the computers cuto¤ value correctly you will get 12 tokens (we will subtract nothing from you), but if you were completely wrong, i.e. if you said 6:2 while the computer was using a cuto¤ of 0:2 (or said 0:2 when the computer was using 6:2), you would receive 0 tokens.
Put di¤erently, we are asking you to state a cuto¤, call it the value c, which separates the region the computer (or the subject you are paired with) has associated with the word "low"and the word "high" as follows:
We have devised this scheme so that if you wanted to make the most amount of money in this part of the experiment your best decision would be to state your truthful cuto¤ value, i.e. the one you truly believe the computer is using.
The exact same procedure will be used to elicit an answer from you to question 2, although here we will compare you answer not to the cuto¤ value used by the computer but rather to that used by your pair member when describing the cuto¤ point he thinks the computer is using. If you guessed correctly this cuto¤ point, then you will get 12 tokens, whereas if you were completely wrong you will get only 0 token. Again, given the payo¤ your best decision would be to state your truthful cuto¤ value, i.e. the one you truly believe the other subject is using.
You will repeat this procedure every …ve round.
Total number of tokens you receive in the second part of the experiment will be equal to the sum of your token payo¤s in each round plus the sum of the tokens you received every …ve rounds when you try to guess both the computer's and the other subjects cuto¤s. This number of tokens will become the part of total number of tokens earned in the experiment which will be converted into US dollars and paid to you at the end of the experiment.
each round starts with computer randomly choosing a number x between 0:2 and 6:2 and, given the cuto¤ value used by the computer for the 20 rounds and the interval this number falls in, one of the two announcements, "x is low" or "x is high", is made and observed by both subjects in the pair; each subject in the pair, after hearing the announcement about x but without observing the actual number x picked by computer, then chooses between option A or B;
the …nal payo¤s of the subjects are determined by the payo¤ table described above (you will see the payo¤ table on the screen all the time) and the actual value of x chosen in that round; both subjects then observe the actual value of x and the payo¤s for this round.
after every 5 rounds you will be asked to state what you think the cuto¤ value of the computer is, and what you think your pair member thinks the cuto¤ value used by the computer is.
Instructions for the third part of the experiment.
In this part of the experiment everything stays the same as in part 2 except for one feature. Before the start of this part of the experiment, the computer will divide the interval, [0:2; 6:2] from which number x is picked into 4 (instead of 2) sub-intervals. To each of those sub-intervals a word describing this region will be attached and will stay the same for all 20 rounds of the third part. So, in each round you and the subject you are paired with will hear one of the following announcements: "x is lowest", "x is higher", "x is even higher"or "x is the highest". Everything else stays the same.
each round starts with computer randomly choosing a number x between 0:2 and 6:2 and depending on the cuto¤ value used by the computer and the interval this number falls in, one of the four announcements: "x is lowest", "x is higher", "x is even higher" or "x is the highest", is made and observed by both subjects in the pair; each subject in the pair, after hearing the announcement about x but without observing the actual number x picked by computer, then chooses between option A or B;
the …nal payo¤s of subject are determined by the payo¤ table described above (you will see the payo¤ table on the screen all the time); both subjects then observe the actual value of x and the payo¤s for this round.
after every 5 rounds you will be asked to state what you think the partition the computer uses is, and what you think your pair member thinks the partition the computer uses is. Your payo¤s here will be identical to those described in part two of the experiment except that the instead of stating one cuto¤ you will need to state three: one cuto¤ separating the "lowest" region from the "higher"region, one separating "higher"region from the "even higher"region, and one separating the "even higher" region from the "the highest" region. In other words we are asking you to choose three numbers c 1 , c 2 , c 3 such that the following is true:
As in the previous part of the experiment we will pay you for your guess as follows: let c 1 , c 2 , c 3 be the cuto¤s of the computer (or your pair member's guess of the computer's cuto¤) and let c 1 , c 2 , c 3 be your guess. Then your payo¤ will from guessing will be determined in an identical manner as we did in part two except for the fact that in this part you will have three cuto¤ values instead of one. More precisely, your payo¤ will be determined as follows: Again, we have devised this scheme so that if you wanted to make the most amount of money in this part of the experiment your best decision would be to state your truthful cuto¤ value, i.e. the one you truly believe the computer is using.
Your payment for this part of the experiment will consists of 2 parts as in second part of the experiment: number of tokens you received in each round will be summed up and in addition you will be rewarded for stating partitions (the same way it was done before).
Instructions for the forth part of the experiment.
In this part of the experiment everything stays the same as in part 3 except for one feature. Before the start of this part of the experiment, the computer will divide the interval, [0:2; 6:2] into again 2 sub-intervals: [0:2; 5] and [5; 6:2]. But instead of announcing the word associated with each sub-interval, you will observe the interval itself. That is, if x is below 5 then you will observe the announcement "x is between 0:2 and 5" and if x is above 5 you will observe the announcement "x is between 5 and 6:2". Both you and your pair member will get to observe that announcement before making your choices.
Note that if x was announced to be in the interval [0:2; 5] then x can be any number between 0:2 and 5 with equal chance. That is, x = 1:3 and x = 3, etc., are equally likely when the announcement "x is between 0:2 and 5". The same is true for announcement "x is between 5 and 6:2": any number between 5 and 6:2 has the exact same chances of being the actual value of x. Everything else stays the same.
each round starts with the computer randomly choosing a number x between 0.2 and 6.2 and the computer announcing the interval x falls in depending on the cuto¤ value chosen by computer at the beginning of this part. This announcement is observed by both subjects in the pair; each subject in the pair, after hearing the announcement about x but without observing the actual number x picked by computer, then chooses between option A or B;
Your payment for this part of the experiment will consist of the sum of the payo¤s you receive in each of the 20 rounds in part 4.
Total payo¤s in the Entire Experiment. Your …nal payo¤s from participating in all four parts of the experiment will be the sum of your token payo¤s in each part converted to dollars at the rate of 29 tokens = $1.
